Syrian Intelligence Memo (English Translated Version)

English translation is mine (feel free to send in corrections). Original Arabic version here (read it!!):

There is a growing trend in the low literacy segment of society to imitate what happened in Tunisia and Egypt by taking advantage of economic conditions in the country and the regional atmosphere which is conducive for popular movements.

It is necessary that we take advantage of past experiences in dealing with the hostile Muslim Brotherhood movement, and benefit from the mistakes of the Tunisian and Egyptian especially given that they had to neutralize the power of the army and Republican Guard from the outset and allowed the media to cover every move until events got out of control.

We don't expect things to progress to a point of serious danger to public order and the country or to threaten the continuity of the status quo. We expect things to continue for several months and after which it will die out and the regime will come out more powerful than ever.

The reduced security committee ... met on 23 3 2011 with regard to protests and demonstrations and it discussed all aspects of the situation - from security to politics to media - and has developed a series of measures and actions. The emphasis of the response will be three-pronged: security response; media response; and an economic-political response.

The detailed plan: the plan depends on three integrated components: information - a security and performance of field - political, economic.

Media

• The demonstrations and protests must be linked to generally despised figures and personalities of Lebanese and Saudi Arabian origin.  In addition, a link should be established between these demonstrations and Zionism and/or America. There is a plan prepared by the security services to implicate Bandar bin Sultan through certain sites using credible and persuasive information.

• An intensive media campaign accusing the protesters of being conspirators on behalf of  Saudi Arabia, Israel and America. Should any killings take place security services media organs must repeatedly accuse armed gangs or extremist of carrying them out and portray security services and the military as helping to maintain security and stability.

• An indirect campaign aimed at sowing a fear of sectarian strife in the Christian and Druze  communities will be conducted away from TV cameras and through private channels. These communities should be made to fear the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremist groups, which they will face if they did not take part in ending the protests in the Sahel .  In addition, the Allawite community will be alerted to the need to defend their regime and their lives that will be threatened by Sunni extremism.

• Assigning agents from the various security agencies to create fake Facebook accounts in order to respond and jam messages, pages and groupings hostile to the regime.  These agents are to attack and discredit opponents of the regime, as well as revealing groups and movements hostile to the President and the country.

• Preventing the media from being present in places of riot, and punish those who convey any news that does not serve the regime, do not show any laxity in this matter.

• Should the protesters be able to transmit any videos and/or images security service media organs should seek to discredit them manipulating/editing these images so that their credibility with the general public is lost.

Second page summary: The second page details the deployment of Christian and Druze military officers into areas of protest and luring them into situations where they have to defend themselves.  In addition, Army units in which most of the rank and file comes from non-protesting areas should be deployed to protesting areas so as to reduce the possibility of rejection of carrying out orders, rebellion and mutiny.

Should the situation become critical a choice between security, stability and  protesters' demands for freedoms should be forced - wherein the choice of security and stability should prevail. This can be implemented with assassinations along sectarian and clan lines , and/or the bombing of places of worship in areas with high [sectarian] tensions.

Political and Economic Measures

• A massive outpouring of support and protest in support of the President of the Republic should be held before his address to the people so that the speech is in response to the demands of these pro-regime masses only. Strict instructions are to be issued to government institutions, trade unions and schools to mobilize staff and students, as well as the distribution of new flags and banners to them.

• The President's speech is to be postponed as much as possible, this delay will project the image of a powerful state in control, along with a lack of interest or worry in the events taking place.  This will also clear the atmosphere and allow for a determination as to the amount of political  and public relations action required.

• The regime should appear unified and coherent, and all developments should seem as no surprise to the regime which should appear to be in control of the situation and all its organs.

• Actions that can be declared in the presidential address before Parliament: increase the salaries of state workers and the development of a plan for the return of financial stability through a  3 month period - especially as this increase may lead to the disorientation of economic interests . The launch of a promise to create new job opportunities throughout the provinces.  Commodity price reductions as well as a partial change of government and a campaign to expose corruption at a ministerial level (this requires a security committee to choose a minister who must be sacrificed) thereby contributing to efforts to persuade the general public of the seriousness of the authorities' reform and anti-corruption drive.

• Ostensibly reduce tariffs on mobile calls (lost revenue can be recovered  through hidden fees).

• Personal and public benefits should be extended to those Muslim and Christian clerics close to the regime.  They should be used to publicly denounce, decry, defame and discredit anti-regime protesters, highlighting religious verses and sayings aimed at deterring the general public from participating in the protests.

• Delegate official [regime] figures marginally acceptable to the [regime-sponsored "official"] opposition in order to launch a dialogue with them.  Of course some of them will immediately accept the overture while others will place conditions  and others still will reject the offer of dialogue.  This will be useful in order to create a continuous sense of controversy and disagreement, depriving those opposed to the regime of the ability to project themselves as a cohesive, compatible and effective bloc are compatible and effective, and additionally keeping them away from the protesters.

• Responding to some Kurdish demands as they relate to naturalization and citizenship.  This action is to be followed only in so far as it does not affect the status quo of the Syrian state and society. This should be construed as a countermeasure to their potential recruitment by foreign actors should the situation deteriorate further than expected. The North Eastern region is the only area open to this possibility.

• Instruct Syrian embassies abroad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to continuously issue assurances to the American and European countries, reminding them of the possibility for turmoil on the Golan front should extremists take hold of the situation.

• Syrian embassies in all countries should closely monitor Syrians communities, their actions and behaviors (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be instructed to act in this regard).

The expected hot spots: Dara - Deir ez Zor - Hama - Banias - and some neighborhoods in various other cities.

Needs: Put on secret alert the various security and media organs.

Note: There will not be a single organ in charge of a detailed plan , its implementation will be carried out by the various branches and sections.

Given that media outlets will be prevented from covering events as they unfold on the ground, we expect them to rely on eye witness accounts, which will become available as some citizens will dare to telephone satellite TV channels with their eye witness accounts. As such, it becomes incumbent on the state security apparatuses' media organs  to mobilize trained agents to call into both state-sponsored media organs and these satellite TV channels as [false]  witnesses in order to undermine and discredit the testimonies provided by civilians. Through these actions on the ground eye witnesses accounts can thus be discredited.

• Assign some members of the People's Assembly to respond to the protesters, instructing them on how to respond.

• Assign some state officials from the affected regions to respond to the local protests in their region.

• If the situation deteriorates and the level of hostility increases to the point where it is hard to ignore, it is necessary to transform and maintain the image that these protests and demands are merely local/private and are not on a national scale.

• Convoys of vehicles carrying pictures of the President of the Republic, to which Syrian flags can be added, should be encouraged among security agents, their friends and children of officials, providing some of these cars with emergency service sirens (ambulance sirens, etc...) in order to create awe in the hearts of passers-by and residents.

• Hosting some opposition members on Syrian television, giving us a chance to be courteous with them, thereby reducing their demands and transforming the [aggressive] demands into a simple request made to and met by the President, this is useful in creating splits among the leaders of the opposition.

• Issuing the Ministry of Education strict instructions and warnings for schools and students about the use of Facebook.

• Assigning some known artists or performers loyal to the regime to speak to the protest areas or to respond to the dissidents and protesters, according to what we tell them to say.

Security element and field performance:

• Zero tolerance to attacks on the symbols of the regime [presumably, such things as statues and posters of Bashar al Assad and/or his father, Hafez al Assad], no matter the cost, as such actions would signal a willingness/readiness among protesters to overcome all red lines.

• It is expected that protesters will gather in high density residential areas in order to draw attention and encourage others to join them.  It is necessary when such events take place, we besiege/cordon the affected area as best we can, while using security agents in civilian clothing to infiltrate the protesters, stirring up controversy and divisions among them and spoiling their assembly as quickly as possible, and should the situation deteriorate to arrest some of the main agitators among them.

• Mandate Information Branch of the Department of Scientific Research Center, in collaboration with two mobile phone network operators, to closely monitor the landlines and mobile lines of known opposition figures.

• Use of intimidation measures among the youth in order to create a sense of dread and a reluctance to participate in protests.  This should include arrests of some youths along a with a general mobilization of the armed forces reserves in order to of fatigue young people and activists and force their integration into military society.

• Fatigue opponents and symbols of resistance through lawsuits of all shapes and  soil and discredit their moral/religious standing/reputation, previously prepared materials and methods can be used in this regard.

• Influential figures in the Syrian opposition should be barred from travel under any circumstances.

• The military's security apparatus should initiate intensive monitoring of all officers of middle or high rank, especially those of the Sunni faith.

• To get clashes between the army and the protesters a clear no-firing order must be  issued to the army.  However, such an order will not apply to clandestine elements of the security services  as well as two special forces battalions [black/secret forces?].  Snipers from these battalions should fire from undisclosed locations, ensuring that the source of fire is indiscernible.  Snipers are permitted to target/shoot soldiers and officers in the Army, as such mobilizing/turning the armed forces them against the civilian protesters.

Any place wherein protests get out of control:

• Isolation of the protest area through a security forces and army cordon, cutting off electricity and telecommunications and the Internet.

• Arrest of some influential figures from this place, and if conditions are critical, orders to kill such figures.

• Introduction of smugglers and criminal gangs into the restive area [exact text is to flood the area with smugglers and criminals] in order to create a state of chaos. 

• Clandestine security agents in civilian clothing are to be inserted into the area of ​​protest and will proceed in convincing protesters to use weapons against the military and security forces.

• Send in security forces and the two clandestine special forces battalions, using snipers to target the protesters.  The death toll from each confrontation should not exceed twenty as this might uncover the operation and expose the regime to foreign intervention.

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