The most immediate threat from a nuclear Iran is not the detonation of a nuclear weapon, but the clout that the possession of such a weapon would provide the Islamic Republic in it's pursuit of regional hegemony. In his latest piece for the
Daily Star, Michael Young argues that Iran's real goal is to establish a permanent foothold in the Gulf through its ability to manipulate the GCC states through . Meanwhile, writing in
NOWLebanon, Tony Badran provides an excellent summary of Iranian actions and incitements in Gulf countries in it's bid to become the region's dominant power.
Young's analysis is undertaken through the lens of an American foreign policy that seems, at once, enabling to the Iranian regime's agenda and destined to ultimately draw the United States into a violent confrontation with that country - an event that Iran is ensuring would be disastrous for the region. Young (who's article deserves to be read in full) writes:
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And let’s add one more item to the bleak mix: Washington’s listlessness actually increases the chances that it will enter into a war with Iran, which Obama has been so understandably keen to avoid.
The Arab state system may well be caught up in a phase of terminal deterioration. Most Arab regimes are old and have lost much legitimacy by consolidating their authoritarianism while offering their younger, expanding populations little in the way of consensual social contracts, useful educational opportunities, and better living conditions. Stalemate prevails, and the onetime sway of leading Arab states has devolved to non-Arab states on the region’s periphery: Turkey, Israel and Iran.
This has had negative consequences for the United States, whose political preeminence in the region rested on the old Arab order. Longstanding American allies such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are weaker than ever before. ...
Looking at American policy, what do we see today? For starters, we see an Iran actively challenging America in the region. This may look like hubris, but the Iranians see little that is worrisome. Take Iraq, which the US fought long and hard over and ultimately stabilized after the spectacular blunders of the immediate postwar years in 2003-2005. Today, Obama’s stubborn priority is to withdraw, effectively denying Washington the primary terrain needed to contain Iran, but also to exercise its power over Syria and to an extent Saudi Arabia.
Iraq’s election results provided an opportunity for the Obama administration. Iran’s closest allies lost ground, in contrast to the blocs led by Ayad Allawi and Nouri al-Maliki. Instead of trying to impose some compromise between the two men that could have created the basis of a more stable Sunni-Shiite order, therefore of a new strategic relationship between Washington and Baghdad, Obama did nothing. Iran saw an opening and is now helping establish a Shiite-led government that will doubtless favor Iranian interests.
... Iran has the added ability in places such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, but also in Yemen, of being able to mobilize members of disgruntled Shiite minorities.
The impact of a Palestinian-Israeli settlement on the Gulf and Iraq, the critical playing field in the American-Iranian rivalry, would be relatively limited. The Palestinians have been a tool used by Iran, as has Lebanon, to protect its core objective: building up its supremacy in the Gulf. Iran’s priority is to progressively undermine America in the Middle East, with other regional tensions, in themselves of less immediate importance to Tehran, feeding into this. Hizbullah and Hamas act as useful shock absorbers for Iran while it develops a nuclear capability, the cornerstone of its bid for regional hegemony.
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Badran, on the other hand, provides a cogent account of Iran's operations throughout the Gulf. In almost every example, Hizballah - as that regime's most advanced and successful offshoot - plays a pivotal role in exporting Iranian "influence" to the region's countries. The piece should be read in full but you'll find some quotes below:
Just as Egypt’s judiciary handed down convictions in the case of a Hezbollah cell that it uncovered, reports surfaced that an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps cell had also been broken up in Kuwait.
This type of Iranian action, while hardly new, is a harbinger of what’s to come once Tehran, which is seeking hegemony over the Middle East and senses an American retreat from the region, crosses the nuclear threshold. It also highlights the precariousness of any containment policy against Iran and its regional proxies.
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The members of the [Kuwaiti] cell apparently included two stateless citizens (known as al-bidoun), a Lebanese citizen who acted as the cell’s liaison with the Iranians, as well as several military officers. One report in Al-Qabas, quoting informed sources, claimed the spy network extended to Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates – which was roundly denied by Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef Bin Abdul Aziz. The Kuwaitis, however, are demanding an overhaul of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) security agreement (which Kuwait had previously refrained from signing) in light of “new challenges,” likely meaning the threat of Iranian security breaches.
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While it’s unclear whether the Kuwaiti cell indeed extended to Bahrain and the UAE, Bahrain has also been subject to subversive activities in recent years. On the eve of the Gaza war of 2008-2009, the Bahraini authorities announced the arrest of a group of Shia militants who had received training in Syria, accusing them of planning terrorist attacks during Bahrain’s national day celebrations.
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As for the UAE, it followed Kuwait’s lead by deporting foreigners, especially Lebanese Shia. Starting in summer 2009, scores of Shia were suddenly expelled. A representative of those expelled linked the deportations to being “part of a community that supports the Resistance.” What prompted these expulsions remains unclear. However, given the role of Hezbollah’s networks in Iran’s regional activities, the decision was not particularly surprising.
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While its conventional military power is limited, Iran has engaged in such manipulation through the IRGC’s Al-Quds Force, amplifying its sway through its surrogates and through arms smuggling. The potential interplay between a nuclear Iran and its regional alliances raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of a containment strategy directed against Iran – which is, nevertheless, fast emerging as a consensus strategy in Washington. Especially unconvincing is the notion that the United States can place the burden of its containment efforts on the shaky scaffolding of the Gulf Arab states.
Iran’s objective is to replace the US as the primary power in the Middle East, and to reshape the region’s security architecture. Tehran has been pushing the GCC countries to sign a new, collective security treaty with Iran, which has presented itself as the new regional security guarantor, therefore, implicitly, the acknowledged regional hegemony. ...
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