Wednesday, May 4, 2011

Clues to Early Christianity?


Could 70 lead books hold the key to early Christianity and the Hebrew converts who formed a portion of that community?  The Economist reports:
The fate of the Jews who followed Jesus is one of the puzzles of the history of monotheism. The New Testament has much to say about a related issue: the dilemmas faced by Jesus’s non-Jewish adherents. ... But when it comes to followers of Christ who were Jewish by culture and religious practice, the evidence is hazier. Such people clearly existed: the Epistle to the Hebrews, a deeply enigmatic section of the New Testament, is addressed to those who were steeped in the lore of the Jewish Temple ... Then there is a handful of references in other texts to Christians who fled eastward from Jerusalem before the Roman-Jewish war of 66AD. One account speaks of an exodus towards Jordan, after the Christian bishop, James, was attacked in the Temple courtyard.

... By the fourth century, a ferocious Cypriot bishop was describing a group of people whom he deemed heretics because they kept the Mosaic law—but who were also loathed by fellow Jews because of their belief in Christ. As in so many conflicts, people who straddled the divide upset both sides.

All that helps explain the excitement generated in recent weeks by the emergence of a collection of lead codices, which might, if they are genuine, throw light on the missing links in Christian and Jewish history. Some 70 or so ring-bound “books”, with up to 15 leaves each, are said to have been found, along with other artefacts, in a cave in Jordan, near the place where the Hebrew Christians seemingly took refuge.

They are now in the possession of an Israeli Bedouin, but the government of Jordan has claimed ownership, saying they came to light on Jordanian soil a few years ago. Amid much confusion, the objects’ keeper asserts that they have been in his family for a century. Ziad al-Saad, head of Jordan’s antiquities department, has said this could be the biggest find since the Dead Sea Scrolls in 1947. David Elkington, who is writing a book about the lead “books”, backs Jordan’s claim, saying it offers the best chance of ensuring the artefacts are open to scholars. An Oxford laboratory, after testing one of the codices, believes the lead might be 2,000 years old.

... But so far, no scientific authority in a position to judge has seen more than a fraction of the objects.

If they are authentic, the lead objects tell a teasing Judeo-Christian story. There is writing in an ancient script, Paleo-Hebrew, which was used by Jews largely for ceremonial purposes. The writing is mostly indecipherable; it may be in code. The imagery features the Jewish feast of Sukkot, which is both a harvest thanksgiving and a celebration of the Jews’ sojourn in Egypt. During this festival, celebrants brandish palm fronds (bound up with willow and myrtle) in one hand and a lemon-like fruit, the etrog, in the other. This is familiar Jewish material, but some may ask what it has to do with Christianity.

A good question. In various forms, most Jewish festivals found their way into the Christian calendar. Imagery and language from Sukkot occur at many moments in the Christian year; in the stories of Christ’s birth, baptism, transfiguration, and most obviously at Palm Sunday, when Christians wave palms (or in Russia, willow twigs) to commemorate Christ’s entry into Jerusalem on a donkey. In Christian commentaries on the Hebrew Scriptures, it is stressed that Sukkot was associated with the advent of the Messiah and with the coming of all nations to worship in Jerusalem. So images of Sukkot would be dear to the heart of Hebrew Christians.

None of that proves a Christian connection. The imagery might also be consistent with an alternative theory which was aired in the Jewish Chronicle, a British weekly: that the codices belonged to forerunners of the mystical tradition which became known as Kabbalah. But by stirring a discussion about the resonance of certain images to Jews and Christians alike, the lead objects have refocused attention on a deep but contentious commonality.
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Tuesday, May 3, 2011

Daily Star Interview with Army Commander Jean Qahwaji


The Daily Star has released the full text of its interview with Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Jean Qahwaji.  The release came in response to an article published by the newspaper which had apparently led "to some erroneous interpretations".

Earlier today MP Marwan Hamadeh, a stalwart of the pro-sovereignty March 14 movement had this to say regarding the Army Commander:
"The new majority's inability to form a government led it to create the joke of requesting the army commander, who should distance himself from political divisions, to name candidates for ministerial positions in the government."

"We hope that General Jean Qahwaji would not embroil himself in a political maneuver aimed at targeting him and the military institution, which is a source of stability for the country,"
Below is a [slightly] abridged copy of the Daily Star interview:
Q: The formula of the “army, resistance, people” is widespread. What is it based on? To what extent are you convinced by this formula and to what extent do you abide by it?

A: The formula of “the army, the people and the resistance” ... was clearly mentioned in the ministerial statement of the national unity Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Saad Hariri which is still currently a caretaker Cabinet awaiting the formation of the new Cabinet.

This formula is primarily resulting from Lebanon’s high need ... to confront the Israeli enemy, especially since this enemy constitutes a permanent threat against Lebanon ... This fact necessitates the existence of a deterrent force which is able to compensate for the disproportionate balance of military powers.

The Lebanese Army abides by this formula since it is part of the decisions and guidance of the political authority represented by the Cabinet and it is totally convinced by this formula since experience has proved its primary role in liberating the greater part of south Lebanon and western Bekaa from Israeli enemy occupation in addition to its role in defeating this enemy in the war of July 2006...

Q: Many reports mention a pivotal role played by Hezbollah inside the army. What is the validity of these foreign reports? What is the type of coordination between the army and the resistance and what is the extent of this cooperation?

A: These reports are erroneous ... since the Army is a unified national institution based on distancing itself from politics, sectarianism and factional issues and does not allow any side to intervene in its internal affairs. Furthermore, the Military institution immediately takes disciplinary measures when any soldier  ... takes advantage of his post to make political relations with any side.

As for the coordination between the Army and the resistance I can say that it is ongoing and its extent is tied to Israeli enemy threats and military developments on the southern border.

Q: The Army receives aid from many sides and countries, especially from the United States. What if this aid were suspended? Is it linked to conditions? Is it sufficient? What are the equipment and expertise that the Army needs?

A: The Army has ties of military cooperation with many friendly and Arab Armies ... The main fields of cooperation are currently based on training, military logistics and the exchange of expertise in addition to receiving quantities of equipment, weapons, vehicles and spare parts. We have repeatedly emphasized that the Army will not accept any aid in case it is coupled with certain conditions which will likely affect the institution’s performance and national inclusive role.

Concerning the types of equipment and weapons needed ... we can say that the Army is in need of equipment and weapons used to maintain security in addition to effective defensive weapons such as airplanes, helicopters, boats, anti-aircraft missiles, armored vehicles and surface-to-surface missiles as well as heavy-duty vehicles.

Q: Some countries have expressed their immediate desire to arm the military institution but it is evident that the Lebanese Army is hesitant with regard to accepting this aid. What is the reason? Do you think that any side is trying to hamper the objective of turning the Lebanese Army into a military strike force?

A: There are many efforts but most of them require huge funding which is currently unavailable to the Lebanese Army due to the difficult economic situation in the country. As for the offers proposed by a number of countries to effectively equip the Lebanese Army with weapons through donations we can say that until this day these offers have yet to be put into actions ... in this context we find it worthy to mention that the Israeli enemy has repeatedly exerted tremendous efforts so that cutting-edge weapons do not reach the Lebanese Army in order to prevent it from establishing a balance of deterrence.

Q: Who is threatening the Lebanese Army more than the other? Is it Israel or radical movements? What is the Army’s plan to confront these threats?

A: This generalization cannot be applied to radical movements since many of them have legitimate principles and doctrines and they endeavor to achieve their objectives by democratic and peaceful means and do not adopt the culture of violence and terrorism.

The Lebanese Army considers the Israeli enemy and terrorism as equal in terms of the threat that they constitute due to the clear contradiction between their characteristics and the nature and make-up of Lebanese society. ... Israel always had historic designs on our land and is still occupying parts of Lebanese territories in the farms of Shebaa, the hills of Kfar Shouba and Ghajar village and refuses the return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland in addition to the daily breaches and violations of Lebanese sovereignty. The second enemy namely terrorism, has constantly endeavored to deal a blow to Lebanese national unity, coexistence as well as our social, economic and security stability.
...

Q: What are the lessons which General Jean Kahwagi drew from the experiences of former Armed Forces Commanders especially General Emile Lahoud and General Michel Sleiman?

A: Every Armed Forces Commander has his own leadership experiences and expertise which distinguish him from any other Commander, despite the fact that they share many common characteristics.

Leadership is an ongoing performance and each commander relies on the achievements of his predecessor and strives to develop these achievements and make his own new achievements to further promote the military institution. If we compare the current situation of the military institution with its situation in 1990 we can clearly notice that a huge development was achieved on all the levels and this is attributed to the tremendous efforts exerted by His Excellency and the former President of the Republic, General Emile Lahoud, and His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic, General Michel Sleiman, who have consolidated the Army’s unity and built it on inclusive national foundations. Furthermore, both Presidents have always strived to equip the army with weapons, increase its personnel and create new regiments, and build additional facilities in addition to stressing professional training on all the levels and for that I am deeply thankful.

Images from Illegal Construction Confrontations

Top: Lebanese soldiers deploy to disperse residents at a street in Tyre, southern Lebanon, April 21, 2011. Two civilians were killed during clashes between residents and security forces over the illegal constructions on public lands in Tyre, southern Lebanon, the National News Agency (NNA) reported (source).  Second: A police car is set on fire by residents in Tyre, southern Lebanon, April 21, 2011. ...(source).  Third: Residents seize a police car in Tyre, southern Lebanon, April 21, 2011. ... (source).  Fourth: A man stands at the entrance of a shop in the building of an illegal construction site in Beirut's southern suburb of Ouzai, Lebanon, Thursday, April 21, 2011. Security officials say a dispute over a building permit in southern Lebanon has descended into a gunbattle that killed two people. Illegal construction is common in Lebanon, where many poor who cannot afford to buy land or apartments end up building on state-owned property (source). Bottom: A set of replica rockets which have been set up by Hezbollah in front of a picture of disappeared imam Moussa al-Sadr and a site where laborers are working at an illegal construction site in Abu Aswad near the southern port city of Tyre, Lebanon, Thursday, April 21, 2011. ... (source).

National Security Team Receives Update on OBL Operation

P050111PS-0210President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden, along with members of the national security team, receive an update on the mission against Osama bin Laden in the Situation Room of the White House, May 1, 2011. Please note: a classified document seen in this photograph has been obscured. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza - original here)

Monday, May 2, 2011

Jordanian Peacekeeper in Cote D'Ivoire

A UN peacekeeper from Jordan Battalion reloads his weapon as he returns fire on troops supporting Ivory Coast strongman Laurent Gbagbo during a patrol in the streets of Abidjan, Ivory Coast on April 3rd, 2011. (AP Photo/Jane Hahn via The Atlantic: In Focus)

Presidential Announcement on Killing of Osama bin Laden


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More Details from Osama bin Laden Raid

A sales person stands in his shop as a TV news reports the killing of Osama bin Laden in Mumbai, India, Monday, May 2, 2011. Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks that killed thousands of people, was slain in his luxury hideout in Pakistan early Monday in a firefight with U.S. forces, ending a manhunt that spanned a frustrating decade (AP Photo via Daylife)

BBCNews on the compound where Osama bin Laden was found and killed:
...
The compound is a few hundred metres from the the Pakistan Military Academy, an elite military training centre, which is Pakistan's equivalent to Britain's Sandhurst, according to the BBC's M Ilyas Khan who visited the area.
...
... it lies well within Abbottabad's military cantonment - it is likely the area would have had a constant and significant military presence and checkpoints.

Pakistan's army chief is a regular visitor to the academy for graduation parades.
...
The target of the operation was the compound, which had at its centre a large three-storey building.
...
The compound was about 3,000 sq yards in size but people from the area told the BBC that it was surrounded by 14ft-high walls, so not much could be seen of what was happening inside.

The walls were topped by barbed wire and contained cameras.

There were two security gates at the house and no phone or internet lines running into the compound, the Associated Press (AP) reports.
...
One local resident told the BBC Urdu service that the house had been built by a Pashtun man about 10 or 12 years ago and he said that none of the locals were aware of who was really living there

According to one local journalist, the house was known in the area as Waziristani Haveli - or Waziristan Mansion.

The journalist said it was owned by people from Waziristan, the mountainous and inhospitable semi-autonomous tribal area close to the Afghan border, which until now most observers believed to be the hiding place for Bin Laden.

This house was in a residential district of Abbottabad's suburbs called Bilal Town and known to be home to a number of retired military officers from the area.

Intelligence officials in the US are quoted by AP as saying that the house was custom-built to harbour a major "terrorist" figure.

It says CIA experts analysed whether it could be anyone else but they decided it was almost certainly Bin Laden.

Pakistani troops arrived at the scene after the attack and took over the area.

BBC correspondents say US troops were probably operating out of a base used by US Marines in Tarbela Ghazi, an area close to Abbottabad.
The Atlantic Wire summarizes some details of the raid as they emerge:
...
The story really begins in August, The New York Times tells us, when the U.S. military and intelligence community got its first big break in the bin Laden manhunt since American forces nearly captured bin Laden during the Battle of Tora Bora in Afghanistan in 2001. American intelligence officials learned that an Al Qaeda courier who was serving as bin Laden's envoy to the outside world was living in a compound in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad, near a Pakistani military academy and not far from the capital, Islamabad,

The Times and AP explain that as C.I.A. analysts pored over satellite photos and intelligence reports over several months, they became increasingly convinced that the compound was housing bin Laden, and that it had been specifically built for that purpose. The AP explains that the three-story, million-dollar compound was surrounded by 18-foot walls with barbed wire, with two guarded security gates serving as the only entrances and a third-floor terrace featuring a seven-foot privacy wall. "No phone lines or Internet cables ran to the property, the AP notes. "The residents burned their garbage rather than put it out for collection."

The Times picks up the story from here. On March 14, as a possible government shutdown loomed, Obama held the first of five meetings with his top national security advisors to hammer out an operation to kill bin Laden. And on Friday, according to the AP, Obama tapped the Navy's elite SEAL Team Six to carry out the mission under the command of CIA Director Leon Panetta, without informing Pakistan or any other allies.

On Sunday, Reuters explains, Panetta turned a conference room at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia into a command center and watched the operation in real time. Top advisers began gathering at the White House around 1 pm EST, Aamer Madhani reports at National Journal, and Obama huddled with these officials to review last-minute plans around 2 pm.

The Times and the BBC provide some of the most thorough accounts of the raid itself, though details in all news accounts still remain murky. On Sunday afternoon in the U.S. (Monday morning in Pakistan), two or three helicopers landed in Abbottabad, with one helicopter crashing because of mechnical failure, according to the Times. The BBC explains that once the aircraft landed, men instructed panicked locals in Pashto to turn off their lights and stay in their homes. In an operation that lasted about 45 minutes, American military and intelligence operatives engaged in a firefight at the compound, fatally shooting bin Laden in the head as he tried to defend himself, and killing the al-Qaeda courier, his brother, one of bin Laden's sons, and a woman who may have been used as a human shield as well. No Americans were hurt, and Pakistani troops soon moved in and seized the area. According to several news outlets, U.S. forces loaded bin Laden's body into a helicopter, flew it to Afghanistan, and buried the body at sea.

The AP tells us that when Panetta and his team received learned bin Laden was dead, "cheers and applause" erupted in the conference room. According to National Journal, Obama learned that bin Ladin had been "tentatively identified" as dead around 3:50 pm, and received further confirmation around 7 pm after DNA and facial recognition tests had been conducted.

While the National Journal has this to say on the operation and the teams behind it:
From Ghazi Air Base in Pakistan, the modified MH-60 helicopters made their way to the garrison suburb of Abbottabad, about 30 miles from the center of Islamabad. Aboard were Navy SEALs, flown across the border from Afghanistan, along with tactical signals, intelligence collectors, and navigators using highly classified hyperspectral imagers.

After bursts of fire over 40 minutes, 22 people were killed or captured. One of the dead was Osama bin Laden, done in by a double tap -- boom, boom -- to the left side of his face. His body was aboard the choppers that made the trip back. One had experienced mechanical failure and was destroyed by U.S. forces, military and White House officials tell National Journal.

Were it not for this high-value target, it might have been a routine mission for the specially trained and highly mythologized SEAL Team Six, officially called the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, but known even to the locals at their home base Dam Neck in Virginia as just DevGru.

This HVT was special, and the raids required practice, so they replicated the one-acre compound at Camp Alpha, a segregated section of Bagram Air Base. Trial runs were held in early April.

DevGru belongs to the Joint Special Operations Command, an extraordinary and unusual collection of classified standing task forces and special-missions units. They report to the president and operate worldwide based on the legal (or extra-legal) premises of classified presidential directives. Though the general public knows about the special SEALs and their brothers in Delta Force, most JSOC missions never leak. We only hear about JSOC when something goes bad (a British aid worker is accidentally killed) or when something really big happens (a merchant marine captain is rescued at sea), and even then, the military remains especially sensitive about their existence. Several dozen JSOC operatives have died in Pakistan over the past several years. Their names are released by the Defense Department in the usual manner, but with a cover story -- generally, they were killed in training accidents in eastern Afghanistan. That’s the code.

How did the helos elude the Pakistani air defense network? Did they spoof transponder codes? Were they painted and tricked out with Pakistan Air Force equipment? If so -- and we may never know -- two other JSOC units, the Technical Application Programs Office and the Aviation Technology Evaluation Group, were responsible. ...

JSOC costs the country more than $1 billion annually. The command has its critics, but it has escaped significant congressional scrutiny and has operated largely with impunity since 9/11. Some of its interrogators and operators were involved in torture and rendition, and the line between its intelligence-gathering activities and the CIA's has been blurred.

But Sunday’s operation provides strong evidence that the CIA and JSOC work well together. ...

... Indeed, according to accounts given to journalists by five senior administration officials Sunday night, the CIA gathered the intelligence that led to bin Laden’s location. A memo from CIA Director Leon Panetta sent Sunday night provides some hints of how the information was collected and analyzed. In it, he thanked the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for their help. NSA figured out, somehow, that there was no telephone or Internet service in the compound. How it did this without Pakistan’s knowledge is a secret. The NGIA makes the military’s maps but also develops their pattern recognition software -- no doubt used to help establish, by February of this year, that the CIA could say with “high probability” that bin Laden and his family were living there.
...
Under a variety of standing orders, JSOC is involved in more than 50 current operations spanning a dozen countries, and its units, supported by so-called "white," or acknowledged, special operations entities like Rangers, Special Forces battalions, SEAL teams, and Air Force special ops units from the larger Special Operations Command, are responsible for most of the “kinetic” action in Afghanistan.
...
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Video: Inside the Osama Bin Laden Compound


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America, Fuck Yeah!

Revelers gather at the fence on the north side of the White House, pose for photographs, chant 'U.S.A.! U.S.A.!' and sing the Star Spangled Banner while U.S. President Barack Obama announces the death of Osama Bin Laden during a late evening statement to the press in the East Room of the White House May 1, 2011 in Washington, DC. Bin Laden has been killed near Islamabad, Pakistan almost a decade after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 and his body is in possession of the United States (Getty Images via Daylife).

The UK's Telegraph reports on how the operation unfolded:
Osama bin Laden was killed by a bullet fired by a United States Navy SEAL during a 40-minute helicopter assault on a fortified compound believed to have been purpose-built to hide the al-Qaeda leader.

Three other men were killed in what a senior Obama administration official described as "a surgical raid by a small team designed to minimise collateral damage".

These were believed to be two al-Qaeda couriers who lived at the compound, along with their families, and an adult son of bin Laden. A woman being used as a shield by one of the al-Qaeda men during the firefight was also killed and two other women wounded.

A helicopter involved in the raid suffered mechanical failure and was blown up by the American team, none of whom were killed or injured. The Pakistani government was not informed of the raid until after it was over.

Details of the make-up of the team that killed bin Laden were closely guarded but the CIA was closely involved in the planning and execution of the raid.

Troops from a SEAL unit - the US Navy's elite Special Forces cadre that draws its name from Sea, Air, Land, is understood to have formed its core.

It took years for the compound to be located. Initially, the CIA knew only the nom de guerre of a man believed to be a trusted courier for bin Laden. Four years ago, his true identity was discovered and two years ago the places in Pakistan where he frequented were established.

The crucial breakthrough came last August when the compound where the courier lived along with his brother, another courier, was pinpointed and President Barack Obama briefed. The compound was in an affluent area of Abbotabad where many retired Pakistani military officers lived.

Initially built in a secluded area at the end of a dirt road, more homes had sprung up nearby. But the compound was about eight times larger than any other residence. It was protected by two security gates and 12-18ft high walls.

The main three-storey building in the compound had a terrace hidden from view by a 7ft wall and many areas were sealed off by internal walls.

Although the value of the compound was assessed at $1 million, the two couriers had no known source of income and there was no telephone or internet service.

Unlike their neighbours, occupants of the compound burned all their rubbish.

American intelligence agencies involved in assessing the compound included the CIA, the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Agency.

Eventually, it was concluded that a third family lived in the compound - the bin Laden family, including the al-Qaeda leader and his youngest wife.

A drone strike on the compound was considered but ruled out because of the danger of killed large numbers of Pakistani civilians.

Instead, Mr Obama gave his authorisation last Friday for a highly risky helicopter assault that eventually took place in the early hours of Sunday morning Pakistan time.
And here is a CNBC report on the team that carried out the operation:
The military team that killed Osama Bin Laden is an elite special forces group unofficially called Seal Team 6.

Officially, the team's name is classified and not available to the public, technically there is no team 6. A Tier-One counter-terrorism force similar to the Army's elusive Delta group, Team 6's mission rarely make it to paper much less the newspaper.
...
The members of Team 6 are all "black" operatives. They exist outside military protocol, engage in operations that are at the highest level of classification and often outside the boundaries of international law. To maintain plausible deniability in case they are caught, records of black operations are rarely, if ever, kept.

The development of SEAL Team 6 was in direct response to the 1980 attempt to rescue the American hostages held in Iran. The mission was a terrific failure that fell apart at many points and illustrated the need for a dedicated counter-terrorist team capable of operating with the utmost secrecy.

The Team was labeled 6 at the time to confuse Soviet intelligence about the number of SEAL teams in operation at the time. There were only two others.

Team 6 poached the top operatives from other SEAL units and trained them even more intensely from there. Even among proven SEAL's the attrition rate for Team 6 is reported to be nearly half.

There are no names available for current Team 6 members, but the CIA does recruit heavily from their numbers for their Special Operations Group, so it makes sense that they were chosen to work with the CIA on this mission.

Team 6 is normally devoted to missions with maritime authority: ship rescues, oil rigs, naval bases or land bases accessible by water. There are no waterways near Bin Laden's compound.

When a former Navy SEAL was called for a comment about this article all he could say was: "You know I'd love to help you man, but I can't say a word about Team 6. There is no Team 6."

Sunday, May 1, 2011

Ahmadinejad Loses Key Fight in Iran

In this picture taken on March 8, 2011, Iranian Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi, takes off his glasses in an undisclosed location, in Tehran, Iran. Iran's parliament is telling President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to obey an order from the country's supreme leader to reinstate Iran's intelligence minister. The statement from lawmakers deepens the high-level political battle over Heidar Moslehi, who resigned Sunday over an apparent rift with Ahmadinejad. But Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei quickly ordered Moslehi to remain (AP Photo via Daylife).

It looks like Ahmadinejad has lost a key fight within the complicated internal politics of Iran's autocratic theocracy. The Washington Post reports:
Iran’s spy chief took his seat at a planned Cabinet meeting in Tehran and waited with the other ministers for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The embittered president never showed up.

It was all another bit of political theater last week amid Iran’s current — and deeply complex — power plays between the increasing confident Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi and the suddenly defensive Ahmadinejad, who refuses to accept Moslehi and has boycotted Cabinet sessions despite an order from the country’s highest authority.

Political dustups are nothing new to Iran, where parliament bickers regularly and Ahmadinejad and the ruling clerics have traded tense moments. But few can match this one for its raw nerve and serious stakes, which reach into the highest levels of how Iran is ruled.
...
Ahmadinejad could hardly have picked a more potent adversary than Moslehi, who was restored to the powerful intel post by Khamenei just hours after resigning April 17 apparently under pressure from Ahmadinejad.

The embarrassing slap has invited speculation that Khamenei’s once-blanket support for Ahmadinejad — particularly in the critical months of chaos after his disputed re-election in 2009 — could be now fraying by his repeated attempts to push the limits of his powers.

It also shows the importance the ruling clerics place in the intelligence minister, who is deeply involved in both Iran’s international policies and its domestic spy networks that are pillars of the regime’s control.

A serious fall from Khamenei’s favor would undoubtedly leave Ahmadinejad’s clout diminished as a lameduck leader and test the loyalty of his main supporters, including the Revolutionary Guard that will have a central role in picking the candidates for his successor in 2013.

Ahmadinejad’s opponents, meanwhile, have seized the moment. A group of lawmakers has revived a petition drive for Ahmadinejad to be called before the chamber for questioning, giving his critics room to raise the extremely unlikely — but still headline snagging — scenario of impeachment.
...
On Friday, a hard-line cleric used his nationally broadcast sermon to indirectly warn Ahmadinejad that he would be moving into dangerous territory by escalating his challenges to Khamenei.

“Obedience to the supreme leader is a religious obligation as well as a legal obligation, without any doubt,” said Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami. He did not mention Ahmadinejad by name, but it was clear he was referring to the president.

Last week, Khamenei even made a rare public rebuke to Ahmadinejad, saying he will not hesitate to intervene in government affairs whenever necessary.
...
Iran’s top Arab ally, Syrian President Bashar Assad, is struggling to quell a growing revolt that threatens his regime. In the Gulf, Iran’s standing has taken sharp blows after Sunni leaders accused Tehran of backing Shiite uprisings in Bahrain and elsewhere. Bahrain’s main business group called Saturday for a boycott of Iranian goods.

At the same time, Ahmadinejad is backed into a dispute he cannot be expected to win.

He accepted Moslehi’s resignation after apparent disputes over decisions by Moslehi — the only Islamic cleric in the Cabinet — to dismiss close Ahmadinejad allies in the ministry.

But Moslehi appears to have a direct pipeline to Khamenei, who has the final word on all matters of state.
...
Khamenei has repeatedly praised the 54-year-old Moslehi, who previously served as Khamenei’s representative to the Revolutionary Guard’s vast civilian network, known as Basiji, that serves as the ruling system’s proxy in nearly every neighborhood around the country. When Moslehi was appointed to the intelligence post in 2009 — as part of political shake-ups after the postelection protests — he told parliament that the ministry’s work would “bring a smile” to the supreme leader.

In March, Moslehi relayed a message from Khamenei to the ministry staff that they should not pay attention to “political trends or individuals” but instead work under the direction of the supreme leader. This was widely interpreted as an endorsement of proposals to make the intelligence services a special organization directly under the supreme leader — the same status as the Revolutionary Guard.

For years, Ahmadinejad has counted on the Guard as the bedrock of his support. But even that could be showing some stress fractures.

The day after Khamenei’s intervention to save Moslehi, the Guard-run newspaper Javan slammed Ahmadinejad and his close aides. It suggested that “unsavory elements” aligned with Ahmadinejad sought to use the intelligence ministry for political gain — an apparent reference to efforts at undermining political rivals for next year’s parliamentary elections and the 2013 presidential race.

Then the Bakeri Online website linked to Ahmadinejad fired back, claiming that Moslehi wanted to sell out the ministry to the Revolutionary Guard.

“It’s getting very complicated for Ahmadinejad now,” said Alfaraj. “He sought to make Moslehi a scapegoat. He feels he has to stick to it. He’s pushed himself into a very tight corner.”