Syria Will Return After Israel Destroys Lebanon

Writing in NOWLebanon, Michael Young spells it out:

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Syria never accepted its Lebanese military withdrawal. I’ve argued that for its president, Bashar al-Assad, the prime objective in the coming years is to reverse what happened in 2005 and return his tanks to Lebanon. But several conditions are needed for him to do so: Arab acceptance, Israeli approval and an American green light.

Arab acquiescence, given the ongoing fear of Iran in the region and its extensions such as Hezbollah, may be a foregone conclusion. Israeli consent, if the proper conditions are met, may be easier than we imagine, hence the importance of statements like Netanyahu’s. That would leave the United States, which initially would resist a Syrian redeployment in Lebanon. But before going too far along that path, consider a scenario that might dilute American disapproval.

Imagine if there is a new war between Lebanon and Israel, and this time Hezbollah manages to put up a tough fight for longer than it did in 2006. Having been armed with more advanced Syrian weapons, including effective anti-aircraft missiles and longer range rockets, the party might be able to turn a new war into a serious brawl. Israel’s reaction would be to destroy Lebanon far more extensively than it did four years ago, including its economic infrastructure.

In that case, the Lebanese state and government would be discredited, impoverished, humiliated, and would have to face the inevitable angry public backlash head on. United Nations resolutions, particularly Resolution 1701, would effectively be rendered null and void. Regionally, the Arabs, but also Israel, would regard Hezbollah as a major menace (thanks to Syrian efforts to strengthen the party militarily and ensure it remained a menace). Washington, its attentions elsewhere, could be less inclined to say no if there is a regional consensus, one that the Lebanese support either by conviction or through intimidation, in favor of a Syrian comeback.

Damascus would, of course, market this as a means of stabilizing Lebanon and keeping an eye on Hezbollah, to which it would, nonetheless, give a wide margin of maneuver, since only a Hezbollah perceived as dangerous justifies a Syrian presence in Lebanon.

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