Hizballah Continues to Target Lebanese State

NOWLebanon's managing editor, Hanin Ghadar, writes:

A new campaign against Lebanese state institutions is underway. This time the target is Finance Minister Raya al-Hassan’s proposed budget for 2010. ...

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But first, what does Hezbollah want from Lebanon? The Party of God does not want an Islamic state. That would make it an easy target. Instead, it is easier for Hezbollah to whip up the masses by pointing to the poor performance of the Hariri government while not having to offer solutions or alternatives to the country’s social and economic problems.

This is because its agenda is strictly political. After the Syrian army’s withdrawal in 2005, Hezbollah stepped in and rallied the pro-Syrian camp against a March 14 movement that threatened to revive state institutions and ensure genuine national sovereignty.

Now that this has been achieved, Hezbollah still needs to take care of a few other items of business. First, it must overturn UN Security Council resolutions 1701 and 1559, two decisions that were designed to safeguard Lebanon’s long-term sovereignty. Second, it must stamp out the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), the court established to bring to justice the killers of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and dozens of other victims of political violence.

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Economically, the party’s model follows that of distribution rather than production. The process is simple: Hezbollah spreads funds that come from Iran among its supporters or its charitable institutions. This creates a state of dependency rather than self sufficiency, a situation not helped by the specter of war. ...

On a security level, in 2006 Hezbollah effectively transformed the country into a stretch of the Israel-Iran frontline, where Lebanon no longer matters. In fact, in a televised speech broadcast during the 2006 war, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah stated, “Whether the Lebanese liked it or not, Lebanon and the Resistance are waging a fight on behalf of the Muslim Umma (Nation).”

All this is not good news for the Lebanese, including the Shia, who, despite being so closely associated with Hezbollah, are the first to pay for the party’s reckless policies. Hezbollah’s wars destroy their towns and villages. Investors will never put their money in the South, while Shia youth leave in droves in search of work and security abroad.

So back to the municipal elections: Hezbollah may have created a culture of resistance, but the Shia community has maintained its social dynamic. Look, for example, at the current municipal elections, when Hezbollah and the Amal Movement could not, as they had planned, impose consensus lists in all villages in South Lebanon. In short, family proved to be stronger than party and showed that the Shia’s social and cultural fabric has not been totally absorbed by Hezbollah or, to a lesser extent, Amal.

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A friend from the South once told me: “I support Hezbollah because in 2000, they promised us peace of mind. In 2006, they delivered a ‘divine victory’ and dignity to the community. Now they should let us live.”

Hezbollah knows it cannot afford a war now, but paralyzing the state institutions makes it clear to the Lebanese, including the Shia, that it has little else to offer.